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A NEW CRITICAL
EXAMINATION
OF AN
IMPORTANT PASSAGE
IN
Mr. LOCKE's ESSAY
ON
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING;
IN A
FAMILIAR LETTER to a FRIEND.

To which is added,
An EXTRACT from the Fifth Book of
ANTI-LUCRETIUS, concerning the same
Subject; with a Translation in Prose.

Opere in longo fas est obrepere somnum. HOR.

Malcolm  Fileng M.D.

L O N D O N:

Printed for JACOB ROBINSON, at the *Golden Lion* in
Ludgate-Street. MDCCLI.

for the name
of

the following

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the following



THE

Editor's ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Gentleman, to whom the following familiar Letter was addressed, having Leave to communicate it to whomsoever he pleased, and judging it worthy of the Press, thought it no Transgression of his Friend's Instructions to have it printed and published. This Charge I undertook at his Desire; and perceiving that the Letter-writer's Intention was rather to advance some thing's relating to the Controversy he handles, which, he apprehended, were in a great measure new, than to take in the Whole of it, I have subjoined to the Letter an Extract from that admirable Poem, en-

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titled,

titled, *Antilucretius*, accompanied with my own Translation in Prose. This I judged highly proper, for several Reasons: It not only treats of the same Subject, but is actually directed against Mr. Locke, as may be seen in the summary Argument prefixed by the Paris Editor to the fifth Book, of which the Extract is a Part; so that the Letter may be considered as a sort of Supplement to it: And as there has not as yet appeared any Translation of *Antilucretius*, it was hoped the Addition would be agreeable to such Readers, as either might be unapprised of the Original, or not care to read Philosophical Controversies carried on in Latin Verse.



A

LETTER, &c.

DEAR SIR,

{}OU was pleased, in your last
 * Y * Letter, to mention, in very obli-
 {}* ging Terms, the Satisfaction you
 received lately in a certain Company at
 Cambridge, where I made one; and your
 Partiality towards me, inclines you to place
 a large Share of that to my Account.
 If I thought I had afforded you on that,
 or any other Occasion, either innocent

Pleasure, or Instruction, I should be proud of it ; and I can say, with great Truth, that your Conversation never fails to supply me, more or less, with both.

But I find you will not give me good Words for nothing. You desire me to send you, in Writing, the Substance of what I then advanced, relating to that noted Passage in the *Essay on Human Understanding*, about Matter's being capable of having Thought superadded to it by the Omnipotence of the Supreme Being. You urge me so to do, by telling me, I had thrown out some things, which had escaped such Writers, as you remembered to have read on that Subject, the great *Stillingfleet* not excepted. That the clearing up of this Matter may be of no small Service to true Religion, which can be founded only on Truth and sound Reason, whether revealed or natural,

ral. You insist upon my omitting nothing I could recollect to have said upon this Topic, that I thought pertinent, whether I should, at the Time of my writing, think it maturely digested, or not; for you alledge, I am generally over timorous in committing to Paper, to be perused by others, any thing which is out of the common Road. You at length crown all, by positively declaring, you will accept of no Denial or Excuse; and insist upon the Prerogative of Friendship, that I should literally obey your Commands.

SOFT and fair, good dear Sir, you might have abated somewhat of your Vehemence and Rigour upon this Occasion, considering what Sway you know you have over me; but I judge you intended to rouse my Indolence in the most effectual Manner. So taking the thing in
this

this Light, I shall, without any farther Preamble, set about complying with your Request, in the best Manner I can.

WHAT introduced the Subject, you may remember, was my observing, that great Geniuses, who venture to think and write out of the common Road, and from their own Fund, though at Bottom Friends to Religion, and the Interests of Mankind, yet sometimes throw out Singularities and Paradoxes, which may be, and not seldom are wrested by Persons of a loose Turn, so as to do great Hurt. I gave Mr. *Locke* as a remarkable Instance of the Truth of this Observation, who, with all his Penetration, and Uprightness of Intentions, hath not been able to escape being justly censured upon this Account: And that therefore it was incumbent on all Writers, and more especially young Writers, upon momentous Subjects, to be

be very wary and circumspect in advancing new Doctrines; and not only duly consider and weigh the Nature and Proofs of such Doctrines, but likewise carefully examine their Tendency, and the Effects they are like to produce in the World, before they vent them. Upon my naming Mr. *Locke*, one of the Company asked me, with some Emotion, if I had any particular Position in that great Man's Writings in View, that I apprehended had been, or might prove hurtful; I answered in the Affirmative; and reaching to the second Volume of the celebrated Essay, for both stood at hand, I read out of it what follows: "We have the Ideas of " Matter, and Thinking, but possibly " shall never be able to know, whether " any mere material Being thinks, or no, " it being impossible to us, by the Con- " templation of our own Ideas, without " Revelation, to discover whether Omni-

potency

“ potency has not given to some Systems
“ of Matter fitly disposed, a Power to
“ perceive and think, or else joined and
“ fixed to Matter so disposed, a think-
“ ing immaterial Substance, it being, in
“ respect to our Notions, not much
“ more remote from our Comprehension,
“ to conceive, that God can, if he pleases,
“ superadd to Matter a Faculty of think-
“ ing, since we know not wherein think-
“ ing consists, nor to what Sort of Sub-
“ stance the Almighty has been pleased
“ to give that Power, which cannot be
“ in any created Being, but merely by the
“ good Pleasure and Bounty of the Crea-
“ tor; for I see no Contradiction in it,
“ that the first eternal thinking Being
“ should, if he pleased, give to certain
“ Systems of created senseless Matter, put
“ together as he thinks fit, some Degrees
“ of Sense and Thought, though, as I
“ think, I have proved it is no less than

“ a

It is a Contradiction, to suppose Matter, (which is evidently, in its own Nature, void of Sense and Thought) should be that eternal first thinking Being." I was then asked, what Hurt that Doctrine or Position could do to true Religion, and civil Society, since the excellent Author had proved, that the Supreme Intelligence, the Creator of Matter, is himself immaterial; that Matter, in its own Nature, is not capable of Thought; nor even able to put itself in Motion; and that though it were admitted, that by an Exertion of omnipotent Power, a foreign Property should be superadded to it, to wit, a Faculty of thinking, yet Religion, natural as well as revealed, stood safe and unshaken. I replied, That I had not the least Inclination to invalidate his Arguments upon these Heads; that even, if I could, I would not; but that still Hurt might be done by his Way of Reasoning; and that,

in the Course of my small Reading, I found it actually was done.—That Free-thinkers, Spider-like, converted into Poison every thing they read and fed their Understandings with.—That they did not candidly explore and weigh the Tendency or Value of Arguments that concerned their own Notions; but what by stifling, what by exaggerating, and other Methods of misrepresenting, they twisted and distorted them into a Shape quite different from that they were intended to appear in by their original Authors.—That such of the Company as had read *Collins* and *Tindal's* Writings, might recal to Mind many Instances of this unfair Dealing, where disjointed Passages in the Works of Divines, artfully and maliciously stuck amidst their own Sophistry, abrupt Quotations from Scripture, erroneous and false Translations, and not seldom even abominable Lyes, were played off against their grand

grand Enemy Religion, instead of the Artillery of Reason and Argument.

I was then desired to begin my Attack upon the Passage in Question, which I did in the following Manner, not indeed in the same continued Thread of Discourse, for, you know, I was now and then stopped to make myself more clearly understood, than it was in my Power sometimes to do by my first extemporary Words; and to remove Objections that were occasionally started.

I shrewdly suspect, Gentlemen, that to superadd Thought to Matter, while it still remains Matter, upon Mr. *Locke's* own Principles, implies a Contradiction. Matter, says he, is evidently, in its own Nature, void of all Sense and Thought: from which, I think, it follows, that it is not susceptible of Thought, while it continues Matter; as a poor Man cannot pos-

ses a large Estate while he continues poor. The Nature of every thing stands possessed, if not actually, yet potentially, of every Property that is deducible from the essential Attribute of that thing; and every other Property is not only foreign to, but incompatible with it. To superadd such a Property to it, seems to be giving what cannot be received; which is a Contradiction, because, without actual Reception, there may be indeed an Offer, but no Gift. To superadd to Matter a Property incompatible with its Nature, while its Nature remains the same as before that Property was bestowed upon it, seems to be making it both what it is, and what it is not, at the same time. That this is not too subtle or strained a Piece of Reasoning will, I think, appear from Mr. Locke's Manner of defending himself against the immortal Prelate his Antagonist. "The Idea of Matter, says he, is

" an

“ an extended solid Substance; wherever
“ there is such a Substance, there is Mat-
“ ter, and the Essence of Matter, what-
“ ever other Qualities not contained in that
“ Essence, it shall please God to superadd
“ to it. For Example, God creates an
“ extended solid Substance, without su-
“ peradding any thing to it; and so we
“ may consider it at Rest: To some Parts
“ of it he superadds Motion, but it has
“ still the Essence of Matter; other Parts
“ he frames into Plants, with all the
“ Excellencies of Vegetation, Life, and
“ Beauty, which is to be found in a Rose
“ or a Peach-Tree, &c. above the Es-
“ sence of Matter in general; but it is still
“ but Matter. To other Parts he adds
“ Sense and spontaneous Motion, and
“ those other Properties that are to be
“ found in an Elephant. Hitherto it is
“ not doubted, but the Power of God
“ may go; and that the Properties of a
“ Rose,

“ Rose, a Peach, or an Elephant, change
 “ not the Properties of Matter, but
 “ Matter is, in these things, Matter still.”

There is, Gentlemen, I think, more Art,
 I wish I could not justly call it Sophistry,
 in this Passage, than one would easily ex-
 pect from so fair and candid a Disputant
 as Mr. *Locke* generally shews himself:
 “ God, says he, creates an extended so-
 lid Substance, without superadding any
 “ thing else to it.” Here he forgets, or
 pretends to forget, that an extended solid
 Substance is only an abstract Idea, or an
Ens Rationis, existing no-where, but in
 the Mind of the Conceiver; and therefore
 cannot be created; it being impossible for
 any Parcel of Matter to exist, without
 other Properties, besides the generical Cha-
 racteristicks of Matter: Whatever exists,
 really is a concrete Individual, and is pos-
 sessed of all the Attributes that concur to
 constitute it the very thing it is. If it is

a Parcel of Matter, supposing it to be at Rest, yet it must be of a determined Large-ness, Figure, and Density ; it must be either homogeneous, or otherwise ; it must be either organised, or not, &c. Here one would think, that the common School Philosophy, which our Author despised so much, owed him a Shame. But whether this be only an inaccurate Expression, or purposely intended to make his Reasonings pass the more current, it is the Foundation of the erroneous and unphilosophical Doctrine here defended.

“ To some Parts of it he superadds Motion, but it still hath the Essence of Matter.” It is of the Essence of Matter, that any Part of it whatever is capable of being moved ; and therefore, when it is actually put in Motion, there is nothing added to the Essence of Matter, Rest and Motion being indifferent to that Essence. As Extension and Solidity

do

do not include either Rest or Motion; so they exclude neither. In this Case, there is only a new Fact or Event, as *Lucretius* expresses it, which before was easily practicable, influenced, and brought about. But here the fundamental Error likewise operates: A Piece of Matter extended solid, and set in Motion, without any other Property or Mode, is a mere *Ens Rationis*, as much as if it were at Rest, and cannot really exist. "Other Parts he frames in-
" to Plants, with all the Excellencies of
" Life and Beauty, which is to be found
" in a Rose or a Peach-Tree, above the
" Essence of Matter in general; but still
" it is but Matter." Still the old Blunder recurs, as if the Essence of Matter in general were a concrete Substance, and could actually exist naked, as it is conceived, and unfurnished with any other Property. But as that is impossible, it is evident, that in a Peach or a Rose, there is

is nothing more above the general Essence of Matter, than in the simplest Kinds of Matter that exist, suppose elementary Water, Quicksilver or Gold, which are the three most simple, most homogeneous, and most immutable Bodies hitherto known in Nature. A Rose or a Peach hath various Properties, besides Extension and Solidity; and so hath Water and Quicksilver; and so must every corporeal Mass have, that either is or can be created. In short, for I begin to be tired dwelling on so clear and trite Things, nothing can be justly said to be above, or superadded to, the Essence of Matter, or any thing else, that is fairly deducible from that Essence. That Essence is an abstract Idea, and constitutes the highest *Genus*, comprehending under it all the different Species, into which such Individuals, as the essential Attributes can be truly predicated or affirmed of, may be ranged, for

the Help of our finite Understandings, which can attend to but one, or a very few Ideas at once. Nay, to say that any Portion of Matter, a Peach for Example, possesses any Property, Mode, or whatever you may please to call it, above the Essence of Matter, and yet remains but Matter, is to affirm a Contradiction in Terms, as it is making a Peach both more than Matter, and no more than Matter, at one and the same time.
THE plain Truth, clothed in this very inaccurate and unphilosophical Language, amounts only to this, that a Peach hath peculiar Properties constituting its Nature, by which it is distinguished from every other Portion of Matter, in like Manner as all other Portions of Matter are distinguished from it, and from one another, by their respective constituent Properties and Attributes, they (including the Peach) having

ying nothing in common, or agreeing in nothing but Existence, Extension and Solidity. This is the Truth, and the Sum total of the Truth in this Matter, but it is easy to be perceived, that, if it had been thus expressed, it would not have served Mr. *Locke*'s Purpose. " To other Parts he adds Sense and spontaneous Motion, and those other Properties that are to be found in an Elephant." Now is the Time that his viewing the Essence of Matter in the Light of a concrete Individual, like a Skeleton fit to be flesh'd, and his using the Terms of *adding to*, *superadding to*, and *being above*, the *Essence of Matter*, begin to stand him in some sort of stead. From complex and beautiful Organisation, the climbing up to Sense and spontaneous Motion, seem'd to be an easy Step. But according to what I have, 'tis hoped, clearly made out, if Sense and spontaneous Motion are not deducible from Extension ^{or compatible with}

and Solidity, if they are not comprehended under that *Summum Genus* of Matter, we have no more Reason to rank any Animal, tho' it were much less perfect than an Elephant, amongst the Species of merely material Parcels or Systems, than to place the Planet *Saturn* in the Order of Animals. " Hitherto, 'tis not doubted, " but the Power of God may go ; and " that the Properties of a Rose, a Peach, " or an Elephant, superadded to Matter, " change not the Properties of Matter, " but Matter is in these Things Matter " still." Here are several Things to be taken notice of: And first the Manner of Expression, which here is artful and trifling to such a Degree, as to degenerate into something very like Nonsense. The Love of Truth compels me to use these harsh Terms. Nothing superadded to Matter can change the Properties of Matter. Where-ever Matter is, there all the essential

essential Properties of Matter must be; and they must be unchang'd, otherwise they would cease to be the Properties of Matter, and become something else. Matter in a Rose or an Elephant is Matter still, and so it must be, were it ¹⁴ an Archangel. The Question is not, whether Matter in Man, or Man's Body, be truly Matter, or no; but whether the whole living, thinking, rational Man, be only a Parcel of organised and agitated Matter, and therefore framed only of one Kind of Substance; or whether he be compounded of two different Kinds of Substances, the one material and organised, the other immaterial, cogitative, and rational, join'd and united together. Secondly, it is not generally agreed, that either an Elephant, or any other Animal, is only Matter modified; and therefore the Truth of that Position is doubted. The *Cartesians* are indeed agreed in it, because they make all Brutes only

only Machines or *Automata* ; and so are the Materialists. But they who maintain the Immateriality of the human Soul, and are not such Fools as to be sway'd by the Authority of *Des Cartes* in these Matters, (who probably did not believe many Things he himself gravely taught) are far from being agreed in the Opinion of the Souls of Brutes being merely corporeal. And lately a great Author urges very strong and weighty Arguments to prove, that if Brutes are not mere Machines, their Minds must be immaterial * : So that in this Place there is a Falshood advanced, which is a violent Presumption of a bad Cause, when so able an Advocate as Mr. *Locke* is so hard set to defend it. Lastly, it is in the Passage before us implied, that Elephants don't think ; a very hard Postulatum, which, I believe, only *Cartesians*,

* *Antilucretius*, Lib. V.

Cartesians,

tefians, and a very few more Metaphysicians, will swallow. For my part, I am not ashamed to own myself on the affirmative Side. I am of Opinion, that their Sensations, especially the inward, and their Volitions, may be properly called Thought, tho' so limited as not to amount to Reason; and even that they think more justly of what they are about in a common Way, than Mr. *Locke* hath done concerning some Points in this Dispute.

You see, Gentlemen, in what Manner Mr. *Locke* defends himself, when pressed home by the learned Bishop; and how full of Sophistry the Passage I have last quoted at large is: And it is in that Passage chiefly he strains hard, and labours with all his Might to varnish over his groundless Scepticism, and make it appear rational. His Reasonings constantly suppose, that abstract Ideas have Archi-

types

types or Models, really existing without the Mind, answering to these Ideas, and divested as much as they are of such Properties as concur to constitute either the inferior Species, or the singular Nature of Individuals. Strange ! that the Author of a Treatise on Human Understanding, so incomparably excellent in a thousand Respects, should upon this Occasion forget his own admirable Doctrine of abstract Ideas, and general Terms, and talk as if he had not understood the Nature of *Genus, Species, and Individuum*. Thus, I flatter myself, I have been as good as my Word in making it in some measure appear, partly from the Nature of the Thing, but chiefly from the Way in which Mr. *Locke* defends himself, that my Suspicion of there being a Contradiction implied in the Idea of *superadding Thought to Matter while it continued Matter*, was not without some Foundation. But as

this

this Argument hath been treated of at large, and urged with great Force by many able Writers, tho', for ought I know, not precisely in the same Way I have just now done, I shall insist no more on it at present, but prepare for a fresh Assault from another Quarter.

Let us suppose any Parcel or System of Matter framed, organised and disposed in the fittest Manner, to which Almighty Power intends to superadd Thought. This being supposed, either Thought must follow in course upon this Disposition, without any new Act of Volition or Power to produce it, or such a new Act is necessary for that Purpose, over and above the previous Disposition. Either the one or the other must be, as these are two contradictory Propositions, between which there can be no *Medium*. Now, I undertake to shew, that ~~in~~^{if} the former

prove the (26)

he ¹ ~~he~~ Mr. Locke contradicts himself, and in the latter, by an overstrain'd Subtlety, endeavours to establish a Distinction, where there is in reality none. For

If, as soon as the Parcel or System of Matter, (we shall call it, for Brevity's sake, the Machine) is properly dispos'd, Thought is immediately produc'd, without any new Act of Power exerted for that determined Purpose, it necessarily follows, that Matter and Motion produce Thought, the contrary to which Mr. Locke not only lays down, but proves*. And even tho' a finite, rational Being had made such a Machine, which implies no Contradiction, that Machine would become a cogitative Being, upon the Supposition, that no sovereign Act of Omnipotence is requisite more than the proper Disposition to endue it with Thought,

* See the whole tenth Paragraph of Chap. x. Book IV.
or,

or, as Mr. *Locke* loves to speak, superadd Thought to it. The Structure and Mechanism of the Machine, in this case, may be as properly said to produce Thought, as a Clock or a Watch rightly framed, and wound up, may be said to point out the Hours, or one Billiard Ball to produce Motion in another, by being driven and impelled upon it.

If, on the other hand, after the Machine is properly disposed and set in Motion, there be still requisite a distinct Act of Volition and Power to make it think, over and above the Disposition; or, in other Words, if after its Organisation is compleated, and its Springs put in Motion, still it could not think, unless Omnipotence so willed and ordered, then ~~per se~~ in that Case I affirm, that when it is actually made to think, there is, in the strictest

Sense, a new cogitative Substance created, and joined to the corporeal Machine, and not barely Thought superadded to Matter as a Property or a Mode: For if the Machine, when completed and set agoing, could not think, but by the Will and Power of the Supreme Being, then the Fabric and Action thereof has no natural Connexion with, nor Influence on Thinking, and no other but what the Will of the Creator hath determined. He could make a Pebble think in the same Manner, were it not inconsistent with infinite Wisdom to act with Impropriety. He could have made the same cogitative Being independent on, and separated from, that or any other Parcel of Matter whatever; unless it should be denied, that the Supreme Intelligence can create a pure Spirit. As the Organisation and Action of the Machine did not produce Thought,

so the thinking Part may subsist after that is destroyed ; and therefore cannot be justly deem'd a Mode or Property of Matter.

BUT further, is not an immaterial, cogitative Being as real a Substance as Matter ? What Reason, then, is there in one compounded of Matter and Thought, as Man is, to make Matter the Substance, and Thought the Property, any more than, *vice versa*, to make the cogitative Part the Substance, and the material the Property ? Suppose a cogitative Being were first created, and Matter by Omnipotence superadded to it, would there not be in that Case an actual Creation of Matter, and an Union of it with Mind or Soul ? Would Matter then be only a Property of Mind ? And is there not the same Reason to believe and affirm, that when Thought is superadded to Matter,

there

there is a new cogitative Substance created, and join'd with a corporeal one, unless Matter and Motion can produce Thought ?

FROM all which, it appears to me a fair Consequence, either that Matter and Motion must be acknowledged capable of producing Thought, which is directly contradictory to Mr. *Locke's* Reasonings on that Subject ; or, that wherever Thought is, as he expresses it, superadded to Matter, there a new cogitative Being or Substance is created : And therefore, that there is no Room for the Distinction contained in these Words, "Whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter, fitly disposed, a Power to perceive or think, or else joined and fixed to Matter, so disposed, a thinking immaterial Substance."

Thus

Thus I have, in Obedience to your Commands, put in Writing the Substance of what I advanced, in Opposition to Mr. *Locke*, the last Time I had the Pleasure of being in Company with you. Whether you will approve of my Reasonings upon a Review, as much as you seemed to do, when you ~~first~~ heard them, I know not; one thing, however, I am sure of, to wit, that I have discovered Sophistry in some of his Reasonings; and, in one Instance, a manifest Falshood averred, to support his Cause. I desire you will, at your Leisure, communicate what Remarks either yourself, or any of your ingenious Friends, make upon my Letter; and for that end, . . . you Leave to shew it, not only to the Gentlemen that were with us, but to any one else you please, provided my Name be concealed. This I positively insist upon; for though few have a greater Love for Truth than myself,

self, yet I choose not to figure in Studies and Controversies so remote from my Profession: Besides, the Dress of this hasty Production is too homely and negligent, to justify its appearing in any other Manner than *incognito*.

I am,

Dear SIR,

May 28,
1751.

Yours, &c.

A N

EXTRACT

FROM THE

Fifth BOOK of *ANTILUCRETIUS*;

WITH A

TRANSLATION in PROSE.

F



Ex ANTILUCRETH Libro Quinto.

De MENTE. Ver. 1011.

PROTINUS h̄ic autem, non est mihi
 cognita, dices,
 Materiæ natura satis comprehensa virtus,
^{+ ap. 14} Ut circumscribam verbis, quid possit ~~aspici~~,
 Quid nequeat. Quis enim tantum sibi su-
 mat, ut ipse
 Cùm se se ignoret, singillatimque per omnia
 Incerto soleat titubans prorepere gressu,
 Anteferatque manum, & baculo quasi
 singula tangat,
 Collidi in tenebris metuens, aut luce ma-
 lignâ;
 Fundamenta tamen rerum omnium, &
 ultima quæque
 Visa sibi velit obtutu penetralia firmo?

Quidni



An EXTRACT from the Fifth Book
of ANTILUCRETIUS, intitled,
Of the Mind and Soul.

YOU will here readily alledge, that I have too imperfect a Knowledge of the Nature and Power of Matter, to be able to determine, and define by Words, what Properties it is susceptible of, and what it is not. For who, you will say, should be so presumptuous as, tho' he knows not himself, and usually creeps through every Path of Knowledge uncertain and stumbling, and, as it were, holds out his Hand before him, and tries every thing in his Way by the Touch of his Staff, fearing lest he should be bruised in the Dark, or in a deceitful Light, yet to desire to have it thought, that he sees the Foundations and utmost Recesses of all Things by certain In-

Quidni Materies, cui dotem adscribimus
unam,

Ut triplici protensa modo concreverit,
hanc vim

Possideat quoque, uti velit atque intelligat ?

Unde

Corruerent subitò geminæ discrimina partis,
Quâ compactum hominem facimus, du-
plicemque putamus.

Forsan Materiæ ratio primaria non est
Aut per se extendi, aut per se cognoscere ;
verùm

His aliquid majus, natura videlicet ipsa
Ex quâ utrumque fluit : ceu bini ex arbore
rami

Dispariles, unâ tamen à radice profecti :
Namque hæc Spinosæ fuerat sententia nuper.

Quis tunc Materiâ poterit secludere Men-
tem ;

Altera dos quamvis à Mente extensio distet ?

Nam sonus ac lumen distant ; & corporis
ambo

Sunt

tution? Why may not Matter, to which
 we ascribe one Property of being extended in
 Length, ^{or} Depth and Thickness, likewise
 possess this other Power of willing and un-
 derstanding? Whereby the Distinction be-
 tween the two Parts, whereof we make
 Man compounded, and so a two-fold Sub-
 stance, would tumble down at once. Per-
 haps the principal Attribute of Matter is
 neither solely to be extended, nor solely to
 think; but something greater than either of
 these singly; to wit, its own proper Na-
 ture, from which both these Properties
 flow, as two Branches of a Tree, which,
 tho' unlike in their Appearance, yet spring
 from the same Root or Trunk; which Opin-
 ion hath been of late broached by Spinoza.
 Who upon this Supposition could exclude
 Mind from Matter, tho' Extension, its
 other Property, differs from Mind? Sound
 and Light differ, yet both are Accidents
 of

Sunt eventa, neque à naturâ corporis absunt.

Haud secus inter se distant color atque figura;

Sed globus esse potest idem niger atque rotundus.

Ergo Materiæ modus excellentior esset.

Cognitio: perfecta magis, cùm scilicet illi Organa suppeterent forsitan meliora; mihi nūsve,

Organa cùm fabricæ forsitan pejoris adessent.

MIRARI satis hic nequeo, quis tetricus horror,

Despectusque suî, quæ mortis prava libido Lymphatas hominum mentes incesserit,

ut se,

Corpore mortales cùm sint natique sepulcro, Mortales animo esse velint penitusque cadiacos.

Tantus amor nihili ! Tanta est vecordia !

Solum hoc

Permetuunt cæci, ne Mens compage solutâ

Duret

of Body, and not foreign to its Nature. In like manner, Colour and Shape are quite distinct Things; but the same Globe may be both black and round. Upon this System the Mode of Thinking should be deem'd the more excellent of the two, and the more perfect, perhaps, in its Kind, the better the Organs are which belong to it, and less excellent, when furnished with Organs of meaner Structure.

HERE I cannot enough wonder, what gloomy Horror, what despicable Thoughts of themselves, and what depraved Love of Death, hath seized the infatuated Minds of some Men, that being mortal in their bodily Part, and born for the Grave, they would likewise be mortal, and entirely perishable in their Souls! so great is their Passion for Annihilation! so extreme their Folly! The sole Thing these blind Reasoners are afraid of is, lest their thinking

Part

Duret adhuc nimiūm vivax, bustoque su-
perstes

Evolet: hoc cupiunt unum, ut cum cor-
pore vitam

Ponat, & in ventos tenuis velut aura re-
cedat.

Ah! te ne subeat, Quinti, tam dira cu-
pido!

Verūm infixa priūs quia te sententia turbat,
Haud tibi defuero, quin hoc caligine ple-
num

Abstulerim velum ex oculis noctemque
fugarim.

Audi quæ moneo paucis, iterumque re-
sumo.

Quicquid Naturæ est, ac verè con-
stituit rem,

Hoc sine res non esse potest, aut Mente
videri.

Haud aliter nobis rerum natura patescit.

Quam si non sequimur normam perverti-
mus ipsi

Rerum

Part should outlast their corporeal Frame, and, surviving its Interment, fly off, too tenacious of Existence. The one Thing they, above all others, desire and covet, is, that it may die with the Body, and, like a thin Vapour, be dissipated into Wind. Ab, dear Quintus, let not so direful a Wish enter into your Mind ! But, because a preconceived Opinion embarrasses you, I shall not be wanting in my Endeavours to pull off this sable Mask, and chase Darkness from your Eyes. Hear, therefore, attentively what I, in a few Words, admonish you of, resuming Part of what I have before advanced.

WHAT EVER is of the Essence of any thing, and really constitutes it, the Thing which it constitutes, neither can exist, nor be perceived by the Mind without. Thus, and no otherwise, are the Natures of Things known to us. Which Rule if we follow not, we pervert all Ideas of Things, and,

Rerum ideas omnes, & aquæ confundimus
ignem :

Tum procul est Ratio, & sermonis definit
usus.

Qui verò modus est, ut adesse, ita abesse
vicissim

Usque potest ; res esse valet cernique sine
illo :

Sed sine re non esse potest, aut Mente vi-
deri.

Absque modus intelligitur res ipsa : sine
illâ

Non intelligitur modus. Ut si fortè fi-
guram

Contemplete animo, qualis tibi cunque
putetur :

Ecce figuratæ præbet se molis imago.

Sic non concipitur motus, quin mota te-
pente

Res animo subeat ; mixturæ nec genus
ullum,

Quin obversentur positæ quodam ordine
partes.

Cumque modos, ut fert hominis persæpe
voluntas,

Naturâ rerum abstractâ discernimus ipsos,
Sic

as it were, confound Fire with Water. Then Reason is banished, and the Use of Speech ceases. But that which is the Mode or Accident of a Thing, as it may be present, so likewise it may be absent with a Continuance; and the Thing can exist, and be perceived by the Mind without it; but the Mode cannot exist, nor be understood independently of the Thing. If, for Example, you consider in your Thoughts any Image or Figure whatever, straight the Idea of a figured Mass presents itself. In like manner, Motion is no sooner conceived, but the Notion of a Thing moved enters into the Mind; nor any Mixture, considered as such, but the differing Parts thereof, somehow placed or ranged, must be included in the Notion. And when we contemplate Modes by themselves, abstracted from the Nature of the Substances to which they belong, as one often chooses, and has Occasion to do, we ab-

Sic illos Mente abstrahimus, tamen ut simul adsit

Notities manifesta rei, suspensaque tantum,
Cujus hic est modus, & sine quâ modus
esse nequiret.

JAM fortasse rogas, quanquam nimis
immemor, utrùm

Extendi sit Materiæ natura, modusne?

Quid dubitas? Quod quæris habes. Age
consule normam.

Scilicet hoc fieri nequaquam posse probatum est,

Ut quis Materiem, quantumvis abstrahere
audax,

Ingenii summo pertentet accumine, quin
rem

Cogitet extensam, aut constantem parti-
bus extra

Se positis. In eâ priùs est nihil. Inde se-
quuntur

Omnia, Materiæ non ergò è dotibus una
est,

Non modus aut ramus quidam; natura
sed ipsa.

Extendi. Atque adeò si Mens dos esse pu-
tetur

Ma-

stract them in our Minds in such a Manner, as that a manifest Conception of the Substance itself, to which this or that Mode belongs, and without which it could not subsist, is supposed to be present ; and the Consideration thereof is only suspended.

NOW, perhaps, you ask, tho' somewhat too forgetful, whether Extension is the Essence, or a Mode of Matter ? Why are you at a Loss ? Consult the Rule I have laid down. It hath been proved, that it is impossible for any one, however adventurous in forming abstract Ideas, to conceive Matter by the most acute Imagination, without, at the same time, thinking on something extended, and consisting of Parts beyond Parts. In it there is nothing prior to Extension. From Extension every Thing follows. Therefore it is not one of the Properties of Matter, a Mode or a Branch, but its very Nature. And therefore, if Thought be deemed

Materiæ, dos extensi est, ramusque modusque.

Propterea quoties Mentem meditatis, oportet

Se tibi res quædam meditanti extensa repente.

Offerat: ut ramus truncum arguit, atque modus rem.

Verùm cónscius est hominum unusquisque profectò

Ipse sibi, propriæ dum lustrat singula Men-
tis

Officia: & quærit quid sint, quo-ve or-
dine fiant,

Extensi nihil obversari. Scire laboro

Ac meditor tacitus, quænam sit primula
rerum

Agnitio; quid judicium; quid roboris
insit

Omni arguento, quâ vi pervincere possit,

Ac domitare animum, & trahere in sua

jura volentem:

Immemor extensi confessim hæc omnia
præsto.

Nunc dubiam certâ, & falsâ discernere veram

No-

deemed a Property of Matter, it must be a Property, a Mode, or a Branch of Extension: And, as oft as you conceive Extension, something extended should at the same Time present itself to your Thoughts, as a Branch implies a Trunk, and a Mode supposes a Substance. But certainly every one of us, while he reviews the sundry Operations of his own Mind, and examines their Nature, and the Order in which they are performed, is conscious, that in none of them any Notion of Extension appears. I labour to know what Sensation, or the first and most simple Perception of Things is; what Judgment is; what Strength there is in any Argument; by what Efficacy it can subdue the Understanding, and, as it were, drag it, tho' willing, into a Subjection to its Laws: All this I readily do, without thinking on Extension. I want to distinguish between a doubtful Idea and a certain one; between Truth and Falshood; and to know wherein they

Notitiem cupio, quâ se ratione vicissim
 Impugnant ; quid opinari, quid credere,
 scire,
 Sint in se ; quid sint etiam affirmare, ne-
 gare :
 Dividuum procul est à me, penitusque
 recessit.

Præterea quid sit, quòd amet se se ipsa
 voluntas
 Præcipuè ac semper, quòd se se ante om-
 nia ponat,
 Et felix velit esse : quid hoc quoque de-
 inde sit, esse
 Felicem aut miserum, & fieri, se judice,
 talem :
 Unde quis invideat ; laudem venetur ;
 honores
 Ambiat ; imperium affectet ; parere re-
 cufet,
 Aut indigetur ; contemptum, oblivia,
 probro,
 Morte sibi pejora putet ; sine nomine vi-
 tam
 Vitalem neget esse, auræ captator, & ardeñs
 Sera immortalem jaculari in sæcula famam :
 Quid sit ab incœpto nunquam desistere
 velle ; Ju-

they oppose one another ; what it is to fancy, to believe, to be certain ; what to affirm, to deny : While I set about any of these things, all Consciousness of Parts and Divisibility is gone, and far removed from my Thoughts.

BESIDES, while I consider the Nature of that Inclination, which prompts every one always to love himself, and to prefer himself to all other things, and wish to be happy ; then what it is to be happy or miserable, and to be so in one's own Opinion ; whence it is, that one envies another ; hunts after Praise ; courts Honours ; affects Dominion ; refuses or despairs to submit ; looks upon Contempt, Oblivion, and Reproach, as worse than Death ; or studying Popularity, and eager to dart immortal Fame amongst remote Posterity, thinks Life, without a splendid Name, not worth the living ; what it is never to desist from what is once under-

H taken ;

Judiciis aliena suis postponere ; pravum,
 Mendacem fieri, deceptorem, atque ma-
 lignum ;
 Assentatores præ veris ponere amicis :
 Hæc ego dum reputans, & me contractus
 in ipsum,
 Heracliti oculis lugens considero, nulla
 Corporis extensi feriunt vestigia mentem.
 Scilicet arguitur propriis erroribus ipsa
 Nobilitas animi. Cernis, dulcissime Quinti,
 Et Mentem nostram, & nostræ molimina
 Mentis,
 Extensi non esse modos ; omniq[ue] vacare
 Materiâ : sine quâ cognoscier illa fatendum.
 Ergo Materiæ virtus primaria non est,
 Ut simul extendi, simul & cognoscere
 possit ;
 Qualem hæc monstra putant, infensa Deo-
 que fibique.

Nec

taken ; to despise the Opinions of others in Comparison with one's own ; to be wicked, lying, treacherous, and malicious ; to mistake Flatterers for sincere Friends : I say, while I attentively consider all these things in my own Mind, and, as it were, contracted within myself, behold them mourning with the Eyes of an Heraclitus, no Vestiges nor Shadow of Extension affect my Mind : So that the Excellency of the Soul is evinced, even by its Errors and Strayings. You see, dearest Quintius, that our Mind and its Functions are not Modes of Extension, but entirely void of, and distinct from Matter, without the Idea of which, it must be granted, that it is conceived and known. From this it follows, that the primary and fundamental Power of Matter is not both to be extended and capable of Thought, as these Miscreants, who enlist themselves Enemies both to God and their own Interest, imagine. And

Nec, veluti sonus ac lumen, color atque figura,

Aut gemini ex unâ venientes arbore rami,
Extensi ratio, atque animi vis ipsa putentur;

Sed quasi naturæ duplices pugnare vicissim
Dotibus adversis : quarum altera semper agatur,

Altera semper agat; labentibus altera constet

Particulis, habeat nullas in se altera partes.

SUNT in Materiâ nobis impervia sanè
Plurima, quæque aciem Mentis, quâ cuncta tueri

Conamur, fugiant. Etenim finita potestas

Ingenii, non assequitur quæcunque per omnes.

Materiæ nexus & vincula particularum
Confieri possunt : quare in caligine densâ
Progredimur sæpe, ac veluti nictamur in umbris.

At si, cuique rei quæ dotes funditus insunt,
Haud

likewise, that Extension and thought are not to be looked upon as two Modes of one Substance, like Sound and Light, or two Branches of the same Tree, but as two distinct Natures clashing with one another by opposite Properties, whereof the one is always acted upon, the other always acting; the one consisting of transitory Parts, while the other hath no Parts at all.

THERE are, it must be confessed, many things in Matter unsearchable by us, and which may constantly elude that Sharp-sightedness of our Minds, whereby we endeavour to investigate all things. For the finite Power of our Understandings cannot attain to the Knowledge of every thing that can be effected by all possible Unions and Combinations of its minute Parts: Upon which Account, we often make our Progress in the Dark, and, as it were, *wink in the Shade*. But though we comprehend not to the Bottom all the Properties of this or that Thing, yet,

for

Haud scimus, plerumque licet cognoscere
saltem

Quis careat. Nos fortè latent primordia
flammæ :

Ast ea compertum est aqueis distare figu-
râ ;

Inque figurarum solo discrimine ponî,
Quidquid aquæ aut ignis proprium est.
Miraculū nondum

Omnia magnetis perspeximus : at mihi
certum est

Magnetem non esse animal ; nec amoris
ab æstu

Ferratas trahere ac secum vincire cate-
nas.

Cur et ab arctoo declinet cardine Mundi
Solis ad occasum, mox & conversus ad or-
tum

Paulisper, res est etiamnum ignota ; sed
illud.

Materiæ subtilis opus toto Orbe fluentis,
Et non ventorum scimus. Quadrare ro-
tundum

Nemo potest ; at quadratum differre rotun-
do

Id

for the most part, we may be apprized of some certain Qualities that it hath not. Let it be granted, for Instance, that the Nature of the elementary Particles of Fire are unknown to us, yet it is made evident, that they are different in Figure from these of Water; and that their proper Natures are distinguished from each other solely by that Discrepancy of Configuration. We have not as yet discovered all the marvellous Properties of the Loadstone; but to me it is evident, that it is not an Animal, and that it attracts not, and fastens to itself Iron-Chains, from a Passion of Love. Why it declines from the Northern Cardinal Point sometimes towards the West, and sometimes towards the East, is an Appearance not yet clearly accounted for; but we know it to be an Effect, not of the Winds, but of a subtle Matter pervading the whole World. None can square the Circle, but all know, that a Square differs from a Circle, and

Id norunt omnes, quidque ex utroque se-
quatur.

Sic à Matetiâ Mentem fejungimus ; et si
Non omnes liquidò vires utriusque pates-
cant.

F I N I S.



and that different Properties flow from the Natures of each. In like Manner do we distinguish Matter or Body from Mind or Soul, although all the Powers of either be not clearly understood.



ADDENDA.

ADDENDA.

PAGE 16, Line 2, *after these Words,*
so they exclude neither, *add*, that is,
they do not include either real Rest, or
real Motion; but every Piece of Matter
must either be at Rest, or in Motion. As
it cannot be moved without a suitable Im-
pulse, so, where that is not wanting, it
cannot be at Rest,



2
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